Philosophy

Boltonian – an admirable summary (I got a copy of the NS). Like you, I found the article very interesting. The basic point (that a group-selection – kin-selection/selfish gene theory polarity is not necessary; that a “multi-level” approach is the way forward) is clearly plausible if not persuasive.

Some of the points – perhaps tangential – which interest me are as follows.

First – and this is tangential in terms of the other questions it raises – the point about the evolution of “sophisticated cognitive abilities” is interesting. Instead of suggesting – as has been suggested (to my surprise) – that these abilities enabled widespread cooperation, Sloan Wilson and Wilson suggest:

“Our capacities for symbolic thought and communication are communal activities that probably came after a shift in balance between levels of selection.”

The point of interest for me is the communal, ineluctably social dimensions of our cognitive capacities. (Briefly, first, this makes me mindful of a different point: within our own lives, being at the height of our capacities – including ‘mental’ or ‘cognitive’ – presupposes great dependence on others. Second, think about Descartes. His attempt has a far more personal, individualistic take on our cognitive abilities. His famously doubtful methodology comes up with the Cogito. And, yet, he has to present – and actually ‘do’ – all of this in a language, which presupposes sociality or others).
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Second, while her (in)famous review of Dawkins’ Selfish Gene was undoubtedly intemperate (of her own admission) and possibly missed some of Dawkins’ points, there are some questions Mary Midgley has raised in relation to what we might more widely call the ’sociobiological project’. One concerns discussions of ’selfishness’ and ‘altruism’.
I understand that scientists need to use metaphorical language (and not just when describing things to non-scientific dullards like me).

(Indeed, I am glad that they do. Assuming that it is theoretically possible – I am not inclined to say it is – a ‘theory of everything’ would, presumably, be a string of equations. I relish the thought that, were a proud physicist to present me with it, I might yawn at seeing the unintelligible – to me – scrawl and pick up something else to read).
But there is a fundamentally interesting point on ’selfishness’ and ‘altruism’. As discussed in the article, it is behavioural. That is, something is ’selfish’ or ‘altruistic’ if, roughly, it is functionally of advantage to the individual (or group) or it is functionally of advantage to another individual (or individuals). Of course, our understanding of selfishness and altruism in other contexts is v different. It fundamentally encompasses something else: call it intentionality. We describe (assigning praise and blame!) things as selfish and altruist based on intentionality. Someone might do something selfish that ends up not being of advantage to herself (consider the grisly fate that often awaits more ’selfish’ characters in zombie films). Likewise, someone might do something altruistic that ends up being, functionally speaking, of no advantage to other individuals (e.g. those small acts of heroism in concentration camps which didn’t ultimately save the recipients of these kindnesses from their fate).

The questions this raises in my mind are: what colouring does this add to sociobiological analyses? And, perhaps more interestingly, ought it to complicate matters when we apply the (functional) concepts of ’selfishness’ and ‘altruism’ to those creatures which are capable of even of understanding these with intentionality (i.e. us)?

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Third, it continues to raise (as a humanities student) another question to increasing prominence. To take your summary (I think it’s a little longer in the text):

“It helps to explain not just tribal behaviour but animal behaviour, multi-species ecosystems, the nature of religion and rise and fall of empires, among other things.”

At a very vague level, I have no doubt it does – in a sense. But what exactly are the nature and breadth of such explanations?

If I may jump the gun a bit. It seems to me that large parts – perhaps the most important – of human behaviour are most adequately described not in terms of simple cause and effect (as in billiard balls) or in terms of more complicated biological aetiologies, but by giving (for want of a better phrase) reasons for action. (Note that I wrote descriptions: I am considering responses to questions of the sort, what’s going on with x; why’s y doing that etc. I’d add that, often, explanations for something are redescriptions which pertain more closely to the matter at hand). Of course, there are many things which we need not describe in this manner: sleeping, breathing, innumerable movements, utterances etc each day.

But for others, we really do, it would appear, require such descriptions if we were really to get at the nub of what is going on. Aetiologies based on our stone age forebears or whatever is not really going to be particularly illuminating when we consider the specifics of what that female hominid is doing in making motions with her arms and hand (philosopher x is writing this portion of an argument for chapter three of her book). I should add that I am tempted to think that this form of (re)description – reasons for action, or offering narrative teleologies – is neither dispensable or reducible.

With this in mind, I would like greater purchase on precisely what is being explained when we look at these questions. It’s not that I find all this uninteresting. But how does it all fit in?

On a final note: I don’t know E.O. Wilson’s thoughts on this, but I wouldn’t be surprised if they’re cut from a certain cloth. The kind of thing I mentioned above – reasons for action etc – might, it could be argued, be one day replaced by talking of brain states (and thus, more convenient talk of causation is facilitated). I would suggest that such a form of explanation (for our imaginary philosopher, for example) would not actually be a very illuminating answer to the question ‘what is she doing’. Of course, it only would be if we started speaking about chapter threes and portions of argument in relation to brain states: but what is really supplying and conferring intelligibility for our question are not the brain states, but the linguistic redescription of the phenomenon we are describing: (namely, her writing of that portion of her argument on x in chapter three of her new book). (Hope that begins to make some sense).

(forgot to add: you have mentioned possibilities for little contributions from others. Next month, am going to a seminar – not specifically for philosophers – by a philosopher whose bag is free will, after a friend told me about it. This is still a month or so off, but would be more happy to do a small summary to spur some more freewilling discussion).

ChooChoo:

Firstly, your summary of the seminar would be most welcome.

I am reading quite a lot recently about aspects of our make-up that were previously thought of as conferring a competitive advantage which are now thought to be by products. A big brain is one such and language another (both by products of bi-pedalism).

Consciousness might be one of these. But once established these things then became advantages themselves, and so on.

I think that reasoning (asking why and trying to work out the correct answer) is a problem-solving device. We are not naturally gifted in any obviously physical sense: we are neither large nor small; neither fast nor strong; we are naked and intolerant of climate extremes; not great climbers; not well camouflaged; not poisonous etc. We have very few natural defensive or offensive skills. So we need to be very good at problem solving. We can also swim, which brings us the aquatic ape hypothesis, of which I am a bit of a fan. Problem solving might be at the nub of our social skills – trying to work out and predict somebody else’s behaviour from the available evidence. It might also explain our empathetic nature.

Thanks for the summary Boltonian.

I remember studying altruism/group/kin selection etc at uni. None of the theories really gripped me at the time. This multi-level theory certainly sits much better with me.

I read before that you are a fan of the aquatic ape hypothesis; me too! My human evolution lecturer took a group of us to a seminar about it. I might still have the notes somewhere (or I may have recycled them – I had a huge clear out at one point and chucked lots of my uni stuff out). I’m not sure that it is very widely known about, but I certainly find it compelling.

Biskie:

I think one reason for the lack of mainstream academic interest in the aquatic ape hypothesis as that it was publicised (not originated) by a novelist (Elaine Morgan) rather than a scientist. I understand scientist can get quite snobby about this sort of thing; perhaps the scientists here can confirm this.

All:

If anybody who is not familiar with the hypothesis would like a summary, I would be happy to oblige.