Philosophy

Edmund Burke (1729-1797), was the son of an Irish protestant convert and a Roman Catholic mother. He was reputedly born in Dublin, although there is some evidence to suggest that this might have been a convenient fiction to disguise his true birthplace of Co. Cork.

He was born at a time of serious Catholic persecution, which is why his father converted to Protestantism, although his mother remained a lifelong Catholic. Converts, however, were regarded with suspicion from both sides of the religious divide and it is likely that the young Edmund had a pretty lonely time of it. He graduated from Trinity College, Dublin in 1748.

One 17^th century ancestor, John Burke, was mayor of Limerick and when he tried to introduce an element of realpolitik into his dealings with the Crown by supporting the reforms of Charles I he was severely beaten by the local mob of Catholic fanatics.

Edmund’s experience and family history informed his thinking for the rest of his life. His target was the abuse of power. This was a constant theme throughout his career, although his opponents accused him of inconsistency. It was this principle that led him to support American independence and decry the French Revolution.

Following graduation he came to England and disappeared from the records for about six years. There is a suspicion that he converted to Catholicism at this time, much to his father’s fury. What is certain is that he married Jane Nugent, who was, and remained a Catholic and they enjoyed 40 years of happily married life together.

In the late 1750s he began to make his political way in the world, initially as the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland’s personal assistant. In 1765 he became Private Secretary to the Marquess of Rockingham, who had just formed an administration in Parliament. He remained loyal to the Rockingham Whigs, whom he believed was the most principled party in Parliament, until the Marquess died in 1782.

Burke never held high office but he was recognised as one of the foremost political thinkers and commentators of his age, commanding high respect from Dr Johnson (a committed Tory), among others. He had many enemies, mainly among the many establishment anti-Papists but he retained the confidence of Rockingham throughout. He was elected to Parliament firstly in December 1765 as the Member for Wendover; Bristol from 1774 until 1780, and then Malton until 1794.

There are lots of examples of his courageous stand against state corruption; the most celebrated of which was the impeachment of Warren Hastings, sometime Governor of Bengal. He was outspoken, unbending when sure of his ground, and very rarely bested in debate.

His writings on France and its revolution, though the most profound of his works, cannot be read as a complete statement of his views on politics. Burke, in fact, never gave a systematic exposition of his fundamental beliefs but appealed to them always in relation to specific issues. But it is possible to regard his writings as an integrated whole in terms of the constant principles underlying his practical positions.

These principles are, in essence, an exploration of the concept of “nature,” or “natural law.” Burke conceives the emotional and spiritual life of man as a harmony within the larger order of the universe. Natural impulse, that is, contains within itself self-restraint and self-criticism; the moral and spiritual life is continuous with it, generated from it and essentially sympathetic to it. It follows that society and state make possible the full realization of human potentiality, embody a common good, and represent a tacit or explicit agreement on norms and ends. The political community acts ideally as a unity.

This interpretation of nature and the natural order implies deep respect for the historical process and the usages and social achievements built up over time. Therefore, social change is not merely possible but also inevitable and desirable. But the scope and the role of thought operating as a reforming instrument on society as a whole is limited. It should act under the promptings of specific tensions or specific possibilities, in close union with the detailed process of change, rather than in large speculative schemes involving extensive interference with the stable, habitual life of society. Also, it ought not to place excessive emphasis on some ends at the expense of others; in particular, it should not give rein to a moral idealism (as in the French Revolution) that sets itself in radical opposition to the existing order. Such attempts cut across the natural processes of social development, initiating uncontrollable forces or provoking a dialectical reaction of excluded factors. Burke’s hope, in effect, is not a realization of particular ends, such as the “liberty” and “equality” of the French Revolution, but an intensification and reconciliation of the multifarious elements of the good life that community exists to forward.

In his own day, Burke’s writings on France were an important inspiration to German and French counter-revolutionary thought. His influence in England has been more diffuse, more balanced, and more durable. He stands as the original exponent of long-lived constitutional conventions, the idea of party, and the role of the Member of Parliament as free representative, not delegate. More generally, his remains the most persuasive statement of certain inarticulate political and social principles long and widely held in England: the validity of status and hierarchy and the limited role of politics in the life of society.

His arguments in favour of the constitution as a living, moving and imperfect relationship of trust between past present and future is subtle and given thought comes alive in the idea of a changing contract and one that has much to commend itself to the short term ‘goals’ of contemporary politics.

The great strength of thoughtful conservatism is that it understands these contradictions and accepts its own limitations. For at its best and when given voice by men like Burke it once again takes its place within a great tradition of thought and action that mixes social obligation, humility of capabilities and trust in freedoms.

One gets from Burke the idea that things are as they are, by accident, design and serendipity and they could not be any other way. It is within what we have inherited that we must work and not to design all anew.

We hope that this very brief and inadequate synopsis gleaned from various sources will prompt some discussion of Burke’s legacy, philosophy (such that it is), and relevance to today’s political scene. One possible starting point for debate is whether his legacy is still detectable in the modern Conservative Party. Boltonian thinks that it is and Simon not.

Simon Boccanegra and Boltonian