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Maximilian Kolbe

Posted by: gordy | December 10, 2007 | 10 Comments |

Despite appearances to the contrary, this is ChooChoo’s article – not mine!

Here’s that promised piece on Kolbe. I must confess to finding it incredibly
frustrating to articulate and translate my thoughts into words on a screen.
But, for better or for worse, here it is (and apologies for the unseemly
length).

Maximilian Kolbe, 1894-1941 (and Charles)

A dear college friend once told me about Maximilian Kolbe in the midst of a
seemingly interminable late night discussion that flitted between morality,
religion and cooking Thai curries. In retrospect, my points in this particular
discussion – one of many I fondly recall – were not particularly compelling.  I
remember resorting to ‘that’s just your opinion’ rather too often, and my one
good point – about how wonderful galangel is when making Thai (or, rather,
vaguely South East Asian) food – was rather a meagre one. Anyhow, I remember
being quite taken by the story she narrated about Kolbe, and that was despite,
I confess, almost not wanting to be taken by it.

I won’t mention much about his life as a whole, though it is hardly
uninteresting. The aspect which continues to fascinate me is his death. I
cannot write much about the various sources with which this has been pieced
together, though I understand that it is based on the testimonies of various
inmates and camp wardens.  This does not trouble me at all: so much of what we
know about the concentration camps is based on such testimonies (as opposed to
administrative sources) and our knowledge is all the richer for it. The
writings of a Viktor Frankl or Primo Levi are far more compelling – and I mean
that including in the sense of writing history – than, say, a secretary’s log
(even if such a log is vital source material too). It does mean that there are
some things I will not be able to answer if quizzed: for instance, the account
below of Kolbe’s brief dialogue with an Auschwitz commandant doubtless glosses
over the fact of interpretation (I mean in the sense of language barriers).

In February 1941, Kolbe was arrested by the Gestapo and imprisoned in Warsaw.
(He had been involved in various print and radio undertakings before the Nazis’
arrival and, I understand, his arrest was related to this). In May, he was
transferred to Auschwitz. Though he would be dead a few months later, there are
some testimonies about his time there (for instance, by a doctor who treated
him: Kolbe had earlier in the year suffered an inflammation of the lungs).

Now, there was some sort of rule at Auschwitz that if a man escaped, ten men
would be killed as punishment. And, the story goes, in July, a man from Kolbe’s
block escaped. The men from the block were led out in front of the commandant,
Karl Fritsch.  It was understood that the punishment would be the starvation
bunker: at the height of summer, this meant an agonising death, usually in
days, without food or water. Ten men were selected. One of these, Franciszek
Gajowniczek, had been imprisoned for helping the Polish Resistance. He
instinctively exclaimed: ‘My poor wife! My poor children! What will they do?’.

At this point, Kolbe stepped forward, took off his cap and offered himself: “I
am a Catholic priest,” he explained to the commandant, “Let me take his place.
I am old. He has a wife and children.”

Interestingly, the commandant came to agree to this. Gajowniczek stepped back
into file and Kolbe joined the wretched nine in their grim fate. In the bunker,
things soon became terrible. Some men would drink their own urine. According to
a janitor (if my memory serves me correctly), however, there were no screams or
even the sounds of the desperate one might have expected. Kolbe is said to have
led these men in hushed prayers and hymns. A fortnight in, four men remained,
including Kolbe. Needing the cell (for more conspicuous punishment?), the camp
executioner came in to inject each man’s arm with a dose of lethal carbolic
acid. At his turn, Kolbe, kneeling down, is said to have raised up and offered
his arm to the executioner. He died on 14th August 1941. For what it is worth,
I should add that Kolbe was beatified in 1970 and canonised in 1982.
Gajowniczek, I believe, was present at both ceremonies. And, apparently, there
is also one more detail: the man whose alleged escape precipitated the whole
episode was, apparently, found dead in a latrine not long after. It appears
that he had fallen in by mistake.

Now, let me be clear. I do not think that Kolbe’s being Catholic – or even being
a priest – is separable from his story, from his very identity. But, I don’t at
all wish to recall this in a triumphalistic way. (My sister’s ex-boyfriend is a
quarter Polish. His maternal grandmother was an inmate at Auschwitz for several
years and he said that the greatest perversities – he did not specify – in
Auschwitz were perpetrated by Catholic priests).

Rather, I find it interesting – particular the exchange, the literal redemption
of Gajowniczek – for several reasons, albeit ones which are not easy to
articulate. First off, I am struck by, for want of a better phrase, the sheer
goodness of such a deed.  This begs all sorts of questions. What were his
duties? Was this a ‘supererogatory’ act? What were his motives? Do the
consequences matter? For instance, to a strict consequentialist – I mean the
devious kind who is not averse to torturing philosophy students with devilish
scenarios featuring fat pot-holers and narrow cave entrances – upon hearing of
the bare bones of the exchange, it might or might not be good.

Perhaps there is something awry when we can even speak in the language of
consequentialism versus deontology versus virtue ethics etc in immediately
responding to this kind of deed. I’m certainly glad that my immediate reaction
was one which I can only imperfectly articulate as that sense of sheer
goodness. (It’s worth pointing out that this would still be my reaction, I
imagine, even if the commandant had decided to make Kolbe an eleventh damned
man). It is the kind of sheer goodness that animates and relieves so many of
the stories in the Holocaust. There is another one in Primo Levi’s If This Is
Man, and I think it’s worth quoting. The incident takes place during the last
weeks at Auschwitz, when Russian artillery was audible and liberation felt
tantalisingly close:

“That night held ugly surprises.
Ladmaker, in the bunk under mine, was a poor wreck of a man. He was (or had
been) a Dutch Jew, seventeen years old, tall, thin and gentle. He had been in
bed for three months; I have no idea how he had managed to survive the
selections. He had had typhus and scarlet fever successively; at the same time
a serious cardiac illness had shown itself, while he was smothered with
bedsores, so much so that by now he could only lie on his stomach. Despite all
this, he had a ferocious appetite. He only spoke Dutch, and none of us could
understand him…In the middle of the night, he groaned and then threw himself
from his bed. He tried to reach the latrine, but was too weak and fell to the
ground crying and shouting loudly.
Charles lit the lamp…and we were able to ascertain the gravity of the situation.
The boy’s bed and the floor were filthy. The smell in the small area was rapidly
becoming insupportable…And the poor wretch, suffering from typhus, formed a
terrible source of infection, while he could certainly not be left all night to
groan and shiver in the cold in the middle of the filth.
Charles climbed down from his bed and dressed in silence. While I held the lamp,
he cut all the dirty patches from the straw mattress and the blankets with a
knife. He lifted Ladmaker from the ground with the tenderness of a mother,
cleaned him as best as possible with straw taken from the mattress and lifted
him into the remade bed in the only position in which the unfortunate fellow
could lie, He scraped the floor with a scrap of tin plate, diluted a little
chloramines and finally spread disinfectant over everything, including
himself.”

I imagine that upon reading this sort of thing, we marvel at something. One
interesting, additional point, in both cases, lies with what might, from a
particular perspective, be the futility of these acts (though I do not think
that this is quite what we marvel at). Ladmaker will most probably die. Kolbe
might just end up getting both himself and Gajowniczek killed. Even at his
execution – the symbolic gesture of offering one’s arm, of accepting death, of
dying well – is futile, in a sense. And yet these are also symbolically
powerful acts. And something of their power, inevitably, lies in imagining
oneself in such a position. I must confess that, as much as I would like to
think otherwise, I could not vouch that I would act in such a way.

Second, even if our responses to these stories are emotional – and why should
they not be? – I am not so easily convinced that they can be easily interpreted
(and, rather summarily, dismissed) as ‘just’ emotive responses, as if the truly
objective/scientific/rational (delete as appropriate) response would be: Kolbe,
male, bearded, approximately 6”1, member of block x; at 1403hrs, Kolbe speaks
etc. The responses turn upon understanding what is enacted (and, to add another
layer, we might be responding both to Charles’ tenderness and Levi’s recognition
of this tenderness). The actions of a Kolbe or a Charles are intelligible to us.
This does not mean we can possibly know the precise intentions, though we might
imagine them and this imagining has certain limits. At the very least, is there
something about the enactments in such stories, about their very much
intelligible actions, which elicits such a response?

Third, these have to be stories. They are narratives. And I am quite taken by
the idea that, in all sorts of ways, narratives are central to our
understanding of all manner of things. To reiterate, even something like the
Kolbe story or anecdotes in Levi is both completely singular and yet wholly
informative for the light it sheds on the possibilities for human (inter)action
in somewhere like Auschwitz. And it offers the kind of illumination of being at
somewhere like Auschwitz that an entire textbook on the excavation of Auschwitz
could not.

These are scattered – and hopefully – not too trite thoughts. I think that I am
probably right in thinking that most people are moved by such stories and
respond to them with something akin to what I called a sense of sheer goodness
(whatever terms others might use). Let’s say as a general rule that most
people, roughly speaking, do respond in such a way.

Here are two possible questions to consider: what of those who do not respond in
such a way? Suppose someone were to say, ‘Well, Kolbe didn’t save any of the
other nine’, or ‘Charles was being stupid, he should have left that guy to
reduce his own chances of contracting typhus’: are our reactions ‘just emotive’
to the point that I cannot reasonably question the propriety – moral,
intellectual – of such a response?

There were many Jewish boys at my school, and I remember that we always had a
memorial for the Shoah each year. (Jewish assembly – religious assembly was on
Thursday, with various options, from Sikh to Catholic, and a non-religious one
too – was possibly the most popular: you would see boys with turbans listening
to a Rabbi sing on his guitar about kosher food). One time, I remember that we
finished and filed out. There had been readings animated by silent documentary
footage from various concentration camps, including those seemingly familiar
photographs of emaciated inmates. I still remember a boy (Jewish, as it
happens) make a joke, as we treaded out, about their being anorexics and all he
got were silent glares. My long-winded point is this: there is – or, I want
there to be – something more meet, more adequate about the solemn response
almost all of us quite naturally enacted rather than that of the boy who
quipped. It seems to me that our responses were more ‘adequate’ to what we had
seen and heard depicted, they grappled more with what was understood. Or, at
least, our reactions differed not just in terms of emotion, but in our
understandings of the gravity of what we had witnessed.

And, second, if I am right that most people do marvel at such stories, their
marvelling is undoubtedly real: that is, they really do marvel. But are they
just projecting a wholly subjective sense of the marvellous, of ‘sheer
goodness’, onto a Charles or a Kolbe? Or is it truly worthy of marvelling to
offer one’s life for or cradle a fellow inmate with “the tenderness of a
mother”?

under: General, History, Philosophy of religion

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Lots to think about.

There are many theories concerning altruism on the scale of evolutionary development – the summary article published on this site is one such. But, the intriguing thing for me is what makes one person sacrifice his life for another human being (not even related) whereas 99 others would not.

If a degree of altruism is necessary for our survival how does the evolutionary process ensure that there is sufficient of whatever it is that is responsible for selflessness in the gene pool?

Another point you raise is about goodness. I used to be strongly utilitarian about this. We behave well because to do so makes us feel good and that gives us pleasure. Our existence consists of accumulating pleasures and avoiding pain, thus altruism happens. This case is merely an extreme example of that tendency. Would it be easier for a person of certain faith in the afterlife to carry out such an act than a convinced atheist? Just as we balance giving and receiving over the population, so we must balance altruism with selfishness. I now think this sort of behaviour is more subtle than that but I don’t have a cast-iron theory.

Over the population, as I said, a balance must happen between giving and receiving. Most of us do both but are more comfortable with one or the other (usually giving). As a digression, why is giving felt to be a virtue but receiving not? It is very uncomfortable for me to have an offer of help rejected because whomsoever does not want to be a burden or a trouble in any way. Christmas is a terrible time for that when people insist on buying for others whilst discouraging anybody who wishes to give them a gift. Giving without regard to the wishes of the recipient is just as selfish as taking without giving. Maybe this is skewed by my own experience and does not apply to others.

Back to the subject. As a final point, I do not think that innate ‘Goodness’ exists any more than ‘Evil.’ Some people have better developed social skills, a more sympathetic nature, more generosity of spirit, and less selfishness than others. But what makes a few people sacrifice their lives for others, even those for whom they have not known is unclear but probably necessary for our continued survival as a species.

Finally, finally – we cannot know in advance what our own reaction would be under similar circumstances. There are countless accounts of incredible bravery from the meekest of people, whilst those who are naturally bold risk-takers fail the test.

What strikes me is the quasi-mythic quality of these two stories. It almost wouldn’t matter if they were pure literary inventions. Our sense of wonder at such pure goodness, or of the marvellous, to quote ChooChoo’s last paragraph, would be as great.
In fact, perhaps knowing too much about whatever real human motives and frailties Kolbe or Charles may have had might even detract from this wonder. We are in the presence of archetypical representations of goodness. It’s their archetypical nature which sends shivers down the spine and induces awe.
In the counter-example, that of the schoolboys faced with images of the Shoa, the lad who joked to dissipate tension may well have felt as much awe in front of archetypical evil as the others, and just lacked the maturity to handle it.

Eeyore – I think that’s bang on: “quasi-mythic quality. It almost wouldn’t matter if they were pure literary inventions.” Indeed, a story along this sort of line, say, a ‘midrash’ as in Jewish tradition, is nonetheless intelligible and has much in it for both thought and practice.

Incidentally, I’m also struck by what you note about “knowing too much about whatever real human motives and frailties Kolbe or Charles might have had…” (One complication: take hagiography and compare the complex picture of an Augustine with the projected perfection projected onto other saints). I was reminded of the example of Charles in a book by the philosopher Raimond Gaita (’Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception’). He related it to a simple experience he had witnessing a nun ministering to the sick, and spoke of being struck then and there.

You mention archetypical goodness and evil – the Shoah being an example of the other. Clearly strong aspects of this are cultural: the Shoah is such a strong symbol of the possibilities of evil. There is, then, a strong cultural aspect to this. (Consider the litanies of modern day ’saints’ and villains). And yet, are the parameters wholly pliable?

Boltonian – I guess my response would be whether evolutionary psychology renders either of these two examples more intelligible. I am not completely convinced that it does. Bear in mind that I mention Kolbe and Charles not just to highlight their actions, but also to note the understanding those around them (whether the janitor in Auschwitz or Primo Levi) come to of their actions. You ask a fascinating question:

“Would it be easier for a person of certain faith in the afterlife to carry out such an act than a convinced atheist?”

(I’d note that Charles’ action – and he was risking his life – is not in any way related to his being religious. That is, Charles is not – if memory serves me – religious). I become irked when Grayling mentions this as the only or primary motivation for ethical conduct on the part of religious (well, Judaeo-Christian-Islamic) people. It just doesn’t ring true. At the same time, your question is pertinent, though, again, we have to deliberate over whether the afterlife supplies the motivation for action or not. (I am sceptical that, in the main, it does).

Finally, on ‘goodness’. I am not sure what to make of it. You mention your scepticism over ‘innate goodness’. I guess if we can speak of goodness, it might not be wholly dissimilar to how we might speak of ‘healthiness’. There is not one feature – like weight, or heart status etc – which we can point to as being the root of healthiness, though most people are realists on health. It is something which refers to integration and also has a certain flexibility insofar as it can refer to people, things etc. This might be the beginnings of one way to think about goodness…

ChooChoo:

I was attempting to unearth why some people behave one way and some another in similar circumstances. Finding a correlation might be impossible but I was not trying to suggest that there is necessarily any overt or sordid motive for acting altruistically. More that those who have religious faith might be less terrified of their own mortality. Having said that I am agnostic and have no burning desire for everlasting life. But one never knows, as I said earlier, how one will react in particular situations.

The determinist argument is that our genetic inheritance and experiences thereto will decide our behaviour in all circumstances and it is simply lack of knowledge that prevents us from knowing in advance. In that case we cannot take any credit for virtue or blame for cowardice. But we still admire the former and castigate the latter. There must be a deep seated reason (either psychological or, more likely, social) why we have this need. This was brought home to me quite forcefully at the weekend during a conversation with a friend – I won’t bore you with the details.

On ‘Goodness,’ – well, as the philosopher said, ‘First define your terms.’ Does one mean acting altruistically without regard to one’s own safety? Or being generous without expectation of compensation? Or is it such an abstract concept that it becomes either purely subjective (you say s/he is good and I just think s/he has a big but well hidden ego) or difficult to describe but we all know it when we experience it?

I also said that I used to be utilitarian on this but I now think it more complicated. Utilitarianism focuses on the individual – whatever gives pleasure or pain to him or her. Goodness benefits the tribe even at the expense of the individual. I don’t know how this happens in evolutionary terms but it seems to be the the case. I suppose the utilitarian would counter that it is just an unconscious extreme high risk, high reward act – ‘I might die saving your life but if I live I will enjoy all those wonderful feelings associated with self-sacrifice.’

I agree that Utilitarianism focuses too much on the individual – but another problem with Utilitarianism (and this something that my mate Bonhoeffer pointed out) is that of establishing a point in the future at which you will evaluate the consequences of any given action. Such points are arbitrary surely as the consequences of an action will continue indefinitely – take Gravilo Princip as an example – given that his murder of Archduke Franz precipitated WW1 and thus WW2 and thus the establishment of the state of Israel and so on at which point do we begin to measure the happiness or otherwise that his actions caused?

gordy:

I am not sure that actual consequences of a particular action are as important as the believed effect. Princip presumably believed that he was furthering the cause of Serbian independence and not necessarily starting a world war. High risk, high reward (that of being perceived as a hero by those who mattered to him).

It is what we believe will be the consequences of the act that matters not what actually occurs. The law of unintended consequences shows that many (most?) of our our best intentions have either unpleasant side effects, often worse than the disease we are trying to cure, or even result in the exact opposite of that which we set out to achieve.

Boltonian – I think my response here comes across as spiky, so apologies. Far from my intentions.

I agree with you that it is plausible that, in some cases, someone ‘religious’ may be less (or not) terrified of mortality. In terms of altruism, I think there’s a particular complication. Sometimes, it seems to me, discussions of selfishness (or self-serving-ness) and altruism which relate to evolutionary psychology are dealing with something slightly different. Take the example of the mother who risks her life to retrieve her child from a burning building. It may be supposed that, contrary to some readings, this is not ‘altruistic’: preservation of genes etc. But I think that this sort of analysis refers more to the effect of her actions, rather than her (conscious, insofar as they are) intentions. (How does this dynamic change, incidentally, if instead of a mother we speak of a fireman or even a passer by?). To be fair, you are speaking more in terms of motivations. But there is still a tension in my mind – perhaps not one which is without possibilities for either resolution or dissection – between (in vague terms) some sort of (evolutionary) instinct and intentions. This tension holds, it seems to me, if we take seriously intentions (as opposed to saying that intentions are just supplied by – are almost epiphenomenal to – some evolutionary process). To put it another way: it depends on whether or not we consider all human discourse on morality, on discerning the ‘good’ to be expressive simply of some other instinct or mechanism, whether social or physiological.

The sceptre of the dreaded free will question crops up again. But, as ever, I’ll be cowardly in the face of this. You also suggest something interesting:

“In that case we cannot take any credit for virtue or blame for cowardice. But we still admire the former and castigate the latter. There must be a deep seated reason (either psychological or, more likely, social) why we have this need.”

I think it is not misleading to speak of this as a need. But I don’t think it is just a need. Blaming, castigating, praising etc also have aspects which pertain to understanding what one has encountered. Undoubtedly, there are intuitive reasons why as social, linguistic animals we have (quite complex) systems of praise and blame etc. But the content – and our deliberations over this content – are part of the picture too: we can develop complex notions of culpability, complicity and so on. (Moreover, this development depends, in part, on the abilities reflected in our capacity to use and understand the use of things like modal verbs). I would go further and say that they pertain to intelligibility.

On ‘goodness’. I find some solace that – supposing this is not simply a will o the wisp term – other things, like healthiness, are not easy to define. (There is no precise consensus among philosophers of biology). I don’t mean to claim too much on this point. I’m not saying that it’s difficult to do this with healthiness, but it’s (generally taken to be real), therefore the same must go for ‘goodness’. Rather, given the difficulties we have with regard to something like healthiness, the difficulties encountered in terms of goodness do not necessitate we reject it straight away.

Above, ‘goodness’ is as vague as possible, and yet I don’t think it’s unintelligible. A further complication in terms of definition is that ‘good’ can be used in several ways (as can healthy): there are good deeds/thoughts; things which are good for us (whether vitamin c or a bit of adversity); good people. One possible line is that it relates to what is (in itself rather vaguely called) flourishing. This is one possible (rather Aristotelian) starting point. Unfortunately, I’m not very far down any route. But I have strong doubts that the language of ‘good’ is merely a form of personal approbation: ‘x is good’ = ‘I want that x happens’ or ‘do x’ in all times and places. (The use of terms in counterfactuals etc is one problem in this picture).

ChooChoo:

Not in the least spiky but certainly thoughtful. I will need some deep thinking here so please bear with me.

I am not sure why healthiness needs to be exactly analogous to goodness. Other than that I have no immediate response but I will get back when I have created some order from my chaotic thoughts.

ChooChoo:

I would like to understand a little more some of the nuances of your argument.

Can you clarify for me your paragraph on blame/praise? You say that it is more than a need and then suggest (please correct me here) that it is an attempt to understand. I am not disagreeing but I would like to know how it works in practice. Let’s take a recent example.

Two blokes in the pub are having an argument about Joey Barton. One (let’s call him Bill) says Barton is an idiot from a bad lot of a family and should be sacked by Newcastle and should never play for England in the future. Ben, his mate, says but hang on a minute he’s not even been tried yet.

Bill, ‘Well, he’s been in trouble before and his brother’s inside for murder – he’s obviously guilty. Anyway he’s dragged the good name of football through the mud.’

Ben, ‘He’s not been found guilty yet and he’s already been punished for his earlier misdemeanors and his brother is not him.’

Bill, ‘It’s obvious he’s from a family of criminals – get him out of the game before he can do any more damage.’

Ben, ‘So, you propose to ruin a young man’s career and, possibly, his life almost before it’s begun even before he’s been tried?’

Bill, ‘No smoke without fire; it’s obvious he’s guilty and the game is bigger than one man. He hasn’t the brains to change – he will always behave like a yob. Get him out now I say.’

Ben, ‘Ah, brains, that is interesting. If his behaviour is caused by his brain – how can he help his behavour? If it is caused by his upbringing and family influences how can he help that too?’

Bill, ‘So you would just let everybody do what they want and say that they can’t help how they behave?’

Etc etc. This is not a caricature – I had a similar conversation at the weekend and, I am sure, these sort of things are being discussed, mutatis mutandis, all day everyday around the world.

Bill, I venture, was trying to impose his views on Ben (and perhaps vice versa) and will have learned very little from the exchange, except that his mate is a bit soft on villains. Both will probably want to seek out like minded friends who will support their view of the issue. It is a social need that each is not seen to hold his opinion in isolation. They might even modify or distort their positions to gain this approbation because it is so important to them.

On goodness – how can goodness be other than subjective? We might know it when we see it but we will differ in its application or manifestation.

The widow says, ‘My husband was a good man,’ even though most others thought him greedy, selfish and mean. Why this variation? Because he was a good family man who looked after his wife and children and put them before anybody and anything else in the world – even if it meant behaving meanly and selfishly to his colleagues.

If goodness is not concerned with personal approbation it must have some objective quality that we can all agree on. I have not yet experienced this. Whilst she was alive most people would have said that Mother Teresa was a good person but this consensus did not long survive her death.

Other, more negative, emotions come into play when we think of good people – envy, deflected attention, unappealing comparisons etc. So, can there ever be consensus?

Enough for now.

Boltonian – phew! V interesting stuff. I’m going to have to get back to you on this…

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