Bill hasn’t been around for ages. I am intrigued.

Carlon, I agree. Science cannot be the sole approach for unearthing truth, as you say but it is very good at creating a ratchet or ladder, so that we don’t lose what we have discovered.

In many ways I regret the divergence or schism within philosophy. I feel that both science and what we now know as philosophy have diminished since they were one and science was called ‘Natural philosophy.’

Theoretical science has not really progressed much in the last 50 years and, I would say the same about philosophy. I suppose the Vienna Circle put paid to any coming together but perhaps I am being simplistic.

QED, QCD and the isolation of DNA were that last great leaps forward in science. The only thing since those days (1950s and 1960s) that I can think of is the discovery that the universe is not only expanding but accelerating (early 1990s) but we still do not understand the cause. So, we have theories about the 4% of the universe that we can detect (Quantum theory and General Relativity) but, unfortunately, they are incompatible.

Evolution is a very good theory to describe how life develops but has nothing to say about its origins and cannot address questions such as why life? Or why something rather than nothing etc? Also, I am not convinced by Dawkins’ concept of memes.

Has there been any progress in philosophy since Wittgenstein? Most moderns that I have read, or attempted to read, are either lightweight or charlatans (or both) in comparison.

@carlon,,hi,,what prompted you to leave a comment here at the bottom of a 6 month drought

a psi hi @ mr bill,,we will see what happens

Yesterday we touched on the idea that biblical literalism, at least as we see it today, is a post-enlightenment phenomenon and this is very much the position of Armstrong (I have only just started reading the book). I have also taken delivery today of a slim volume charting the history, values and main theses of the Jesus Seminar.

Just flicking through one or two of the essays, I came upon the assertion that serious attempts by scholars to unearth the real Jesus began with the enlightenment. Assuming that Armstrong’s position is correct for the moment, do you think that the two might be linked? In other words the rise of literalism was a reaction to the more scientific approach adopted by some biblical scholars. Thus scholarship began to be seen as a threat to the Christian belief system and a return to a more strict (and coercive) regime was a protective measure developed by some denominations.

I will try to address each of the points you raise so far as I am able but in no particualr order.

Firstly, I cannot comment with any knowledge about Quakerism as a creed. All I know is that it is pacifist and non-doctrinaire. This (and Unitarianism) is really not the type of belief system I am taking about, which is more akin to some eastern religions than mainstream Christianity. There have always been those who have wished or sought to opt out of the struggle for power – many of the monastic orders were founded thus.

Almost all other Christian churches that I know of, large and small, are identified through their system of beliefs. One cannot be a Roman Catholic unless one accepts all of its precepts (not all do in reality, of course), nor a Christadelphian (to take an example from the less numerous end of the spectrum) without accepting that the whole of the Bible is literally the perfect and unimprovable word of God. This latter includes rejecting the concept of the Trinity, for which there is no reference in the Bible.

This leads to some peculiar situations. I caught the second half of a TV programme on Martin Luther King last night, which focused on his religion. His political speeches were littered with references to hearing the word of God, being called by God to do x,y or z etc. But strangely, his most vehement white supremacist opponents also claimed to be doing the will of God when they degraded, lynched, and otherwise persecuted their black neighbours. And most from both sides belonged to the Baptist church, which was almost completely segregated by colour.

The essence of most Christian denominations (as Luther stated) is that one must buy the whole package. Then one must accept the interpretation of those doctrines by the hierarchy. From this follows a whole set of approved (and by implication unacceptable) behaviours.

Thus, to Roman Catholics the Pope is God’s earthly representative and to, say, a Presbyterian he is the anti-christ.

Of course there are overlaps – it would be strange if there weren’t as all Christian denominations supposedly take their inspiration from the Bible. There are overlaps between Buddhism and Christianity too, and between Sikhism and Christianity etc.

This is not the issue for me, however. If all religions were merely expressions of a moral code – a guide as to how we can better live our lives on this earth then there could be some discussion and, perhaps, agreement. But the Abrahamic religions are much more than that – they claim unique access to the (metaphysical) truth and denounce those that believe something different from this.

If one were to take your Venn diagram example of overlapping circles, the degree of overlap would be so small (if one were to be completely inclusive) that it would be reduced to the very lowest of lowest common denominators. Perhaps just to this for Christianity – there is one God and Jesus Christ existed. Exend that to include Islam and Judaism and one loses the Christ (Messiah) element. As for all the other world religions…

I think that saying all 22,000 Christian denominations are more partially common than mutually exclusive is difficult to sustain. Some are closer in doctrine than others, of course, but the reason one is Roman Catholic and not, say, Presbyterian, is because one believes x to be true and not y. I leave aside all the family, social, educational and other influences – that is a whole new discussion. It would be an interesting (and time consuming) exercise to ask each denomination to list its, say, top 20 beliefs (without which one cannot be a Mormon, JW or Roman Catholic etc) and see how many are common to all.

In summary, most Christian churches (with one or two notable exceptions) are doctrinaire and it is these doctrines that give that particular church its legitimacy. It is the method used to control its adherents and, therefore, to gain and exercise power. That power increases its legitimacy and strengthens its control, which is why most mainstream (if I can use that word) denominations have a strong evangelical tradition.

By the way, I am not judging here, merely commenting on what I observe.

Great to have you back posting. I am very happy to take the blame for that .

Lots of things here to think about. I will need to re-read, get my own scattered thoughts in some sort of order and then try to respond.

A couple of points do strike me reading the posts above. Wrt the Bible being ‘divinely inspired’: it’s a phrase which trips off the keyboard very easily but what is actually meant by that? To the literalists it appears to mean in essence ‘divinely dictated’. Speaking personally, and I still consider myself a Christian in saying this, that seems daft to me. To expect a literary work to be unmodified from the first century is a real stretch. ‘Inspired’ I can accept, ‘dictated’ I cannot. But therein lies the issue as has been alluded to before, if not divinely dictated, then who is to do the interpretation?

OK, now as some may know as a Quaker adherent I’d suggest that it’s a complex web almost, the interpretation, and the faith which permits that interpretation, comes from God in silent listening but where the ‘orthodoxy’ provides, if you like to put it this way, a form of theological peer review which keeps you on the straight and narow. That doesn’t mean that you invariably align with the orthodoxy, just that it provides a mechanism which requires careful testing before departure, not nearly the free and easy which it might initially appear to be. But the ‘authority’ comes ultimately from God.

I’m also a little concerned about some of the thoughts about power and orthodoxy. I’d agree that all too easily orthodoxy is used by power structures to reinforce themselves, but argue that iffi the ‘orthodoxy’ is one which, almost paradoxically, rejects such use of orthodoxy for power it is possible to avoid that trap, a self-denying orthodoxy if you like, which is to me one of the most ‘attractive’ aspects of my peculiar faith, the constant warning NOT to use orthodoxy in that way (even if it’s a reminder sometimes forgotten).

Boltonian, you ask how can one eliminate the individual since it is the individual which writes the theology? Is the answer not, by writing a theology which is both highly individual yet suspicious of the individual, deliberately eschewing the power structures which allow any compulsion? Almost the faith equivalent of the checks and balances one writes into constitutions if you like.

Again, I seem to see a false dichotomy (that’s not the right word, my apologies, but I don’t think ‘multichotomy’ is a word at all!) when you ask which of the 22,000 Christian denominations is correct? To phrase the question in that way seems to risk assuming that they are mutually exclusive when they are more partially common, partially exclusive.

I fear I’m not putting this well, in my head I see a Venn diagram of distinct circles versus a Venn diagram of overlapping circles if that means anything to people here. To me, the ‘truth’ is likely to be found in the overlap. To say that the Quaker ‘God’ is wholly distinct from, say, the [insert name of chosen denomination here] ‘God’ is a mistake, the perceptions might be different but it is in the overlap where we agree that the truth is most likely to be found.

I admit, though, that it sounds like an easy sort of, “where we agree it’s God, where we disagree it’s us” argument. I don’t agree that this leads to a dilution of belief however, if anything more a distillation of belief, if that makes any sense. Why is the truth not evident? Because we try to cling to our own human version of our perception too tightly rather than being prepared to accept that we don’t have exclusive rights to God on earth and may be able to learn much from others.

Forgive me if I make myself obscure, it’s late! There are a few more thoughts I’d like to consider, but I only really came here to try to find the get-together details and was surprised to be sucked into reading an article by a Jesuit! (Thank you Gordy, I blame you Boltonian! LOL) I need to do some more thinking.

Obviously I cannot, nor would I wish to, cross swords with you in your specialist area. It is a long age since I was reading the history of the early Middle Ages.

My thinking about homogeneity (probably the wrong word) was an attempt to differentiate the religious mind of rulers pre and post reformation. That there was much more of a coincidence of motive, action and thought from that which we experience today.

I did not mean to imply that Charlemagne ruled over a theocracy nor that tension was not in evidence – the Guelph/Ghibelline wars during 13th century Italy gives that the lie. Just that the King identified himself with his theology – obviously if it became an obstacle to his more temporal objectives there were problems.

Your collective/individual argument depends on what we mean by individual. I mean those that had any power or influence at all in the formulation, propagation and defence of a particular theology. Nowadays we all have that power – we are free to choose or reject any set of beliefs as we wish. And, without descending into cynicism, wishful thinking is a very powerful motivator and the most attractive beliefs would have held the most sway. People believe what they wish to believe until there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary (not always easy to supply).

Of course the position is highly complex and there would have been lots of compromises, deals, power-politics, blackmailing and threats as well as reasoned arguments. I do not doubt, as I said previously, that the winners were sincere in their beliefs, although I am sure that they would have been aware that some things would have been difficult to defend on the grounds of evidence.

The competing factions would have tried to enlist the most numerous and powerful people in their support and attractiveness would have been one of their weapons. Not so very different from the way Islamic jihadists recruit their foot soldiers today.

This is one reason why Therevada Buddhism did not sweep the board in India. It advocates a hard road to enlightenment (eradicating all desire) and the end result (Nirvana) is not the Christian heaven, nor much like it either. It also explains the success of Mahayana in China.

I do not see how one can eliminate the individual because it is individuals who have written the theology, sought approbation, created alliances, formed associations and so on. I agree that pre-reformation worship was very much different from that which followed – a far greater emphasis on ritual and collective activities but that is the norm in a largely illiterate age. I would argue that the church at that time sought to keep things that way. Fear of the mob has always been a preoccupation of the rulers.

There is no essential difference between the evolution of the church and other social and political systems. Marx enlisted scientific argument and reasoning for his dialectical materialism. It is not simply a ruthless grab for power that determines success but rather a blend of might and argument. A wholly repressive regime that achieves nothing for its subjects beyond feeding the maw of its overlord does not tend to last long.

People crave those things necessary for survival and beyond that hope, security, prosperity, and happiness. These things for themselves, their families, their tribe etc. Religion, at least superficially, is better at offering these things over the long term.

Unfortunately, the stakes are quite high because most religious systems depend for their long-term credibility on being true. Now, which version of Christianity is the truth (as many of the 22,000 Christian denominations conflict)? More than this which of the major religions is true, many of which are in conflict with one another? The only possible way all these can be accommodated is through such a diluting of beliefs as to become almost meaningless.

The truth is not evident – if not, why not?

Just a point about your example about clerical lapses being punished more harshly than lay misdemeanors. This is just as true in other social and political contexts – those in a position to do the most damage to the status quo are the ones attracting the highest rewards for conformity and the harshest punishment for transgression. Power and responsibility must be in long-term balance.

Yes, I have read ‘Portrait’ – I was a big fan of Joyce in my twenties. I will immediately dig out my copy and read the passage you refer to.

Point taken about generalisations.

So back to orthodoxy – you suggest that Christian orthodoxy is no different from social or political orthodoxy; and of Charlemagne as an example of the homogeneous nature of church and state.

On this second point, I didn’t quite mean to imply that. I certainly think it would be a weak argument, if someone were to raise the example of Charlemagne, to say ‘that’s the state’: there were not separate spheres in the way this can be imagined today. Yet, at the same time, I wouldn’t quite want to say that Charlemagne shows that (in the 8th/9th century) church and state were homogeneous.

The complex disputes from c.855-869 over the divorce case of Lothar II form a good example. Briefly, in 855, Lothar became king of the middle Frankish kingdom (there were three by this stage), succeeding his father (Lothar I). He married a noblewoman, Theutberga (though earlier he had had some sort of union with a woman called Waldrada who bore him a son). By 857, the (presumably, political) reasons for this marriage had dissipated, and he – with some of his bishops (they were far from unanimous) – brought charges of sodomitical incest against her. From here, the dispute snowballed: it involved Charles the Bald (who ruled the kingdom to the West) and his bishops, not least one Hincmar of Rheims (who wrote a lengthy treatise on the case); Louis the German (who ruled the kingdom to the East); and, eventually (and following an appeal by Lothar II) the papacy under two different popes.

What is interesting is that the aims and anxieties of the different protagonists were rather varied. (Moreover, a simply ‘political’ reading of this whole maelstrom is – some important historians have argued – too restricted). For Hincmar and (the pope) Nicholas I, there were serious points about marriage in all of this: and yet, they both disagreed on questions of ecclesiology. Neither Charles the Bald nor Louis the German (both of whom had designs on this kingdom) took the same line. And so on. When it comes to church and state, things were messy and intermeshed, rather than homogeneous.

Or, another example, take the penitentials: these were (for now this definition will do) manuals for confessors, which often started with a not unsophisticated theology of penance and then listed tariffs of sins/penances. They originated from 6th century Irish (monastic) communities, but soon spread onto the continent. By the 9th century, they were widely disseminated. (One caveat: it’s not so clear how likely it was that your average priest would have had one).

Two interesting things about them: first, the harshest penances were for clerical sins, not lay ones; second, they shared some, even many, concerns with ’secular’ law. For instance, ‘maleficium’ (a latin term it is impossible to translate without context: depending on this, ‘magic’, ‘poison’ etc) had been a concern even among Roman lawgivers and continued to be a concern in the law codes of barbarian successor states (not least the Salic law which was reiterated under Charlemagne). Yet, there was a crucial difference about the penitentials, which is not to deny that they were a mode of social discipline: they were concerned with interior dispositions, with what we would call “sin” rather than with “crime”.

Thus, my point is that the church/state interaction at this time was complicated and messy, but (and despite the Carolingian renewal) we still are not talking about a theocracy here. (Of course, what is meant by ‘church’ and, more starkly, ’state’ is in tension with 9th century material to some extent).

On orthodoxy – I am sympathetic to your presentation of ‘orthodoxy’ as ’status quo’. (We do, however, have a tension here: orthodoxy is used in v general terms – e.g. an ‘orthodoxy’ of anti-americanism among contemporary comedians – or more specifically, say, ‘orthodoxy’ on corporeality in debates on marriage, to say nothing of ‘orthodoxy’ in relation to ecclesiastical councils).

“Once a set of beliefs had been established any variation would be seen as a threat to the getting and keeping of power. I completely accept the point that there were debates and disagreements as to what doctrines should be included and what to reject. There were immense power struggles inside the early church but eventually one (broad) view prevailed and became the orthodoxy. This pattern is common to all social institutions.”

I agree with you on this commonality in social institutions. (In modern times, there are particular elements of this which, precisely in order to be efficacious, must be silent. Indeed, the modern world is more characterised by impersonal power rather than personal power – centred on a king or whoever. Whether this – in every way – is an advance is not always clear to me. By which I certainly don’t mean I’m a monarchist).

The bit I find fascinating is “when a belief had been established”. Perhaps you want to say this too, but I just want to add that this establishment is a murky process. It’s no coincidence that the great church councils of the 4th and 5th centuries were, in a sense, ‘apophatic orthodoxy’: i.e., just as apophatic theology goes about thinking about God negatively (what God is not), likewise with these councils. When we read their proceedings, it all looks a bit arbitrary. But, it makes much more sense when we excavate deeper disputes. What was debated at Nicaea (among other things – and there were many other things – the relation between the son and the father) was a long-standing tension. The purported resolution was not just about power (by which I understand something along the lines of instrumental rationality: i.e. how can I bring x about) but were conceptual (and, thus, sincere). But of course, Nicaea did not solve the problem once and for all.

In fact, I’m not sure we disagree so much on these things: we both recognise power and conceptual elements. (Curiously, even the ‘cuddly’ things people back up nowadays rely on ‘orthodoxies’ – e.g. certain conceptions of human rights – in this sense: of course, another question is whether they’ve got something going for them or not).

Incidentally, two points of disagreement. I don’t think papal infallibility is quite premised on a notion of direct communicability between God and the person of the pope. The understanding is more ecclesiological than that. And it’s complicated, undoubtedly, by questions of power. (It *only* makes sense – and sorry to those armchair atheists who might love to get angry about it – in the context of 19th century intra-catholic disputes. Incidentally, Newman, from what I understand, thought the doctrine was right, but had problems about declaring it).

Second, as you know, I find most (generalised) understandings of religious praxis as premised most fundamentally upon a dash for heaven to be unpersuasive. One problem I have with your presentation is that you suggest the “jam tomorrow” (i.e. salvation) is an individual promise. This could really only be written post-reformation: a v good (sideways) affirmation of this is de Lubac’s Catholicism and the Common Destiny of Mankind, which is heavy on patristics. In early, late antique and early medieval ecclesial communities, the understanding of salvation was strikingly not individualistic. (More generally, there are some who deny we can even speak of the ‘individual’ in the early medieval period, until the later medieval period). All the various micro-christendoms which emerged were distinctly communitarian in their thinking and praxis (I would argue this was true – in a roundabout way – even in the case of the eremitic holy men and women of the late antique East).

Moreover, there is a danger here in referring to this in relation to orthodoxy. Let’s be clear: we’ve all read that famous hellfire sermon in chapter 3 of POrtrait of the Artist. The possibilities – and actual occurrences here – are not being denied. But their pervasion and precise function and intent is not clear. Nor is it clear that this was the thing most central to a) the actions of Christian men and woman (or, to the reasons they could give themselves for action) and b) to the ’success’ of Christian or Islamic political systems.

Incidentally, take Parsi communities in India. They have been ’succesful’ at both integrating without diluting into Indian society and, say, financially. Etc etc. Theoretically, there is a Zoroastrian eschatology on which they could draw, which has a heaven, hell and so on. What is striking is how little (if ever) it is drawn upon. It doesn’t, to my mind, explain individual actions or communal dynamics. And I imagine the same is true for christianities all over the place.

Will have to come back to bible another time!